The Defense of God in the Presence of Pain
Reviewing the Philosophy of Religion: A Critical Introduction, by Beverley Clack and Brian R. Clack
Fifth Analysis Paper

for L1311: Christian Philosophy of Education,
Dr. Andy Pak, Professor Fall, 2001
By Chris A. Foreman, Box 780, November 9, 2001

I. How theodicy defends God and the problem of pain.

Theodicy is a defense of God, specifically God's character and goodness. Elihu's diatribe against Job is an example of an Old Testament theodicy. Clack & Clack list evil (pain) as the greatest challenge to theism (p. 49). They mention two major classical theodicists, Augustine and Irenaeus. These two saints posit that free will is the explanation of all evil. John Hick and Richard Swinburne are cited as modern theodicists who build upon this defense of God's character. Although these defenses of God my be ingenious, Clack & Clack find all of them wanting. They conclude "In responding to it (evil) theologically, the attributes habitually assigned to God need to be reviewed, and the idea of divinity considered anew (p. 67)."

II. Why Tilley suggests that theodicy exacerbates the problem of pain.

Terrance Tilley feels that theodicists formulate abstract arguments and devalue human responses to evil and suffering. He suggests further that they ignore its reality and deal instead with a pale shadow of suffering. He is saying that that theodicists let God off the hook, by undervaluing human pain. Theodicists are in fact rationalizing the problem of evil. This makes the problem worse.

III. Why Phillips suggests that theodicy exacerbates the problem of pain.

D.Z. Phillips feels that any defense of God is misguided. "What kind of cosmic plan can be worth the weight of all this suffering? (p. 62)." Phillips suggests that attempting to defend God in the light of untold evil is an evil deed in itself. Any lawyer who defends a mass murderer by "explaining away" his crimes would be an evil person himself. Phillips feel the same way about theodicists. He concludes by saying that there are things which lie beyond human understanding, and that includes God.

IV. Soelle's consideration of the problem of evil

Dorothee Soelle rejects the idea of a supernatural God by quoting scripture! ( i.e. "God does not exist, because he revealed it to me in scripture.") She insists that we must not concern ourselves with cosmic explanations of pain, but rather focus on helping the suffering. Hers is a victim-centered theory of evil.

V. Midgley's understanding of evil without God

Mary Midgley also avoids cosmic explanations of pain choosing instead to focus upon "how we will be able to combat the wicked impulses in ourselves (p. 65)". She proposes a psychological and educational solution to the problem of evil.

VI. How do we respond to critics of theodicy? What can we say to the problem of suffering?

In reply to Tilley, I would agree that pain is the most personal thing in the world. By nature I am an introverted and melancholy person, but pain will make me scream with emotion. Of course it is absurd to discuss pain rationally. Pain is the opposite of reason. C.S. Lewis in The Problem of Pain introduces some excellent explanations for human pain, yet when I suffer personal pain, all rational explanations go out the window. Tilley complains that theodicists use "emotionless" language and "rational" arguments to support their view. Apologists like Swinburne and Lewis like to use "toothache" as a vehicle for pain because nearly everyone can personally identify with a painful tooth. (I know that I can). Although I can visualize Auschwitz, I cannot personally identify with the pain experienced there. I think that it is philosophers who bring up "baby torture" and "Nazi atrocities" are the ones who are guilty of abstracting, rather than theodicists who speak of a concrete pain like toothache. I wonder if Tilley would convert to the theistic position if theodicists begin to use "emotional" language and "non-rational" arguments? My guess is that he would not. His surface objections mask deeper objections that I could only guess at.

In reply to Phillips, I would agree that there is not an adequate answer for evil. I think that we must admit that human suffering is indeed a challenge to theism. When I hurt, I wonder where God is. I agree that there are too many pat theological answers and glib generalizations. As Christians, we must be humble enough to admit that suffering is a mystery. Sometimes I wonder, "if God is so smart, why couldn't he figure out how to make a universe without suffering. That's what I would have done if I were creator". Phillips solution is to throw out the baby with the bathwater. He says that "there are things which lie beyond human understanding, and that includes God". His is the voice of despair. I would amend his statement to say that "there are things which lie beyond human understanding, and that includes suffering". Like faithful and suffering Job, I hope that I have the courage to say: "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in Him (Job 13:15)".

In reply to Sollee, I cannot imagine why she would turn to the Word of God to support her claim that God does not have words (i.e. a non-supernatural God). Her reference to I John 1:4: "God is love" is hermeneutic cherry picking of the worst sort. Further, there is significant semantic difference between "God is love" and her implication that "Love is God". Yet, Sollee's direction is correct. We may disagree as to the origin of suffering, but let us all agree to help the suffering. I wholeheartedly support this campaign. I would like to point out to Sollee that throughout history it has been theists who have done most to alleviate suffering in our world. This is why hospitals are named after saints and not after philosophers. Could there ever be a David Hume Hospital?

In reply to Midgley, I agree that understanding evil is more critical that accounting for its existence. Evil is with us, so let's deal with it. I am also encouraged by her agreement with Augustine that "evil is the absence of good". I also think that her focus upon personal responsibly for the evil within us is on track. The problem I see with Midgley is her prescription for curing evil. Is she implying that knowledge and psychoanalysis is sufficient to cure evil? If so, I strongly disagree. A knowledgeable crook is simply a more competent crook. In 1939 officers in the German army held more college degrees than the English army. Did university knowledge make them less evil? I see knowledge as knowing what to do. I see wisdom as knowing the right thing to do. I see virtue as acting upon wisdom. Virtue and Goodness are only distant cousins of knowledge. My biggest concern with Midgley is her contention that goodness is possible without a knowledge of God. Can we expect a stream of goodness if we destroy its source?

Finally in reply to Clack & Clack, may I suggest that they find some other line of work. They do not seem to possess the academic objectivity to introduce the philosophy of religion. Their book is subtitled "a critical introduction", but it seems to me that only views of theism are criticized. They uncritically and glowingly present all views contrary to theism. On the final pages of their book Clack & Clack quote Dennis Potter as a "model for religious discourse". They talk about religion being not being "the bandage but the wound". I suggest that they re-title the subtitle of their book to read "a cynical introduction".