Access Research Network
Volume 10, Number 2
Dialogue on Censorship
Introduction
The previous issue of Origins
Research (10:1) featured an open
letter from Chris Foreman to Omni Magazine about science
and censorship. Apparently, Foreman's letter struck a responsive
chord in our readers. We received many positive comments about
his letter. We also received a few negative comments, however.
One of our readers, Paul Ricci, wrote us with a systematic critique
of Foreman's views. What follows is his letter along with Foreman's response.
A Different Definition of Censorship
Editor:
Although I have not had a chance to read the anti-creationist
articles in the February (1987) issue of Omni magazine,
I found the retort to those articles by Chris Foreman interesting
in that his objections reflect some very fundamental differences
between the supporters of evolution and those of creation-science.
Perhaps I can shed some light on the reasons Omni may have
rejected Foreman's letter and why evolutionists, generally, would
disagree with Foreman's arguments.
Censorship and Political Motivation
First, allow me to clarify the issue of who is censoring whom
in the creation/evolution confrontation. It turns out that Foreman
is playing loose and fast with the term "censor" despite
his aid of a dictionary. Unfortunately, Funk & Wagnall's
Desk Dictionary leaves out a very important qualification
in its definition:
"An official examiner of manuscripts (texts, movies,
etc.?) empowered to suppress them if objectionable."
Actually, the efforts of a censor are to eliminate anything
politically objectionable, resulting in a more narrow definition
of "censorship" (Webster's New World Dictionary,
2nd Ed.) than that quoted above. Would it be censorship, for example,
for a library to intentionally omit books on fiction, or written
in foreign languages, or technically advanced, on the grounds
of lack of space or funds? One wouldn't think so but with the
very broad definition quoted by Foreman, , this would be
an example of censorship. Spatial, economic and (by implication)
temporal limitations are not grounds for censorship claims. To
the point, scientists realize there is a great urgency to teach
as much science in a classroom situation as is academically feasible.
Teaching astrology or flat-earth "science" in an astronomy
class is objectionable (despite their tangential relation to science)
on the grounds of lack of time. This is not censorship
(since it is not done for dubious political reasons) though Flat-Earthers
might think otherwise. Similarly, many outdated theories and hypotheses
such as the spontaneous generation of organisms or vitalism (with
its concept of entelechies) are not generally taught in biology
courses because of time restrictions. No censorship is claimed
in either of these cases. The situation is exactly the same for
creation-science. Because of time restrictions in the classroom,
creationism is not taught, need not be taught, indeed, should
not be taught unless and until it becomes accepted as a viable
part of science by the scientific community in the same way they
have accepted astronomy, geology, geography, etc.
On the other hand, qualifying, mis-stating, or omitting evolutionary
theory (or any accepted part of modern science) by a minority
who don't happen to agree with the majority view in this
particular area, is censorship for this is being done for
politically sensitive reasons, viz., to enhance long-since discredited
scientific hypotheses (for whatever motivations). It would be
analogous to a minority of Flat-Earthers modifying or omitting
much of astronomy so they could teach astronomy from the point
of view they think is important.
Foreman's point of letting the evidence determine the place
of creationism in the public schools sounds reasonable until it
is learned that such "evidence" has been examined and
found wanting for creation-science. It is simply not evidence
as judged by the vast majority of scientists and scholars who
have examined both the objections against the evidence
for evolutionary theory (e.g., the Paluxy footprints in Texas),
and the alleged evidence for special creationism (e.g.,
rapid deposition of sedimentary layers). Ultimately, the evidence
as understood and examined by the majority of scholars is what
is and ought to be accepted by the community of scientists and
taught in our public schools, not the dubious "evidence"
of a minority of thinkers who more often than not have some theological
axe to grind.
Metaphysical Baggage
Further, the claim that we all carry around our dispositions,
metaphysical assumptions or philosophical world views when we
do science, may well be true to a greater or lesser extent. However,
to conclude from this that the "metaphysical baggage"
carried by creationists is entirely justifiable is quite erroneous
for two reasons. First, any metaphysical assumptions must be irrelevant
to the postulates or theories of science; these constructs of
science must stand or fall with the examination of the basic count
against it. When the evidence doesn't fit creationism, some new
ad hoc hypothesis is invented or some new clever definition
is incorporated to "save face." In logic this is called
the Redefinist Fallacy and is one of the most commonly committed
types of incorrect reasoning found in creationist writing.
A second point to make about metaphysical baggage is to note
that not all such assumptions run counter to the evidence. For
example, when the (metaphysical?) assumption was made that the
behavior of organisms could be explained mechanistically instead
of using entelechies, no harm was done. Similarly, when it was
suggested that heat could be explained entirely by recourse to
molecules in motion, instead of a mysterious substance called
caloric, the materialistic assumption here was not detrimental.
However, when Einstein postulated that the microcosmic world would
be found to be totally deterministic ("God does not play
dice with the world") he seemed to have been in error (although
there is still some viable debate on this point). Here, Einstein's
metaphysical baggage may have been detrimental to his science.
It is interesting to note in this regard, though, that scientists
have paid greater heed to the generally agreed upon evidence,
to the apparent data from nuclear physics, rather than to Einstein's
strong wish for a deterministic universe. Unfortunately, creation-scientists
are in a position similar to that of Einstein but refuse to give
up their metaphysical baggage in light of an over-abundance of
evidence over the past century and a half in various sciences
from astronomy to zoology. They apparently learned nothing from
the example of Einstein and others.
Redefinist Fallacy
To illustrate how creation-scientists resist changing their
metaphysical baggage when the evidence strongly demands that they
do, consider how they reacted to the discovery that light from
distant galaxies took millions of years to arrive here on earth.
Instead of realizing that the earth could not be young (of the
order of a few thousand years) they put forward the ad hoc
assumption that God created these galaxies along with their
shells of light intact within a few thousand light years away.
Why God would have done something so implausible has never been
clearly explained (though I remember one student claiming He did
so as a test for humans!). Realizing the implausibility of such
strange behavior from an omnipotent God, many creation-scientists
resorted to the ruse that light traveled much faster earlier than
it does today. Coincidentally, this hypothesis involved a rate
of slowing down of the velocity of light from the time of creation
just right to give us a universe only a few thousand years old.
A better example of the Redefinist Fallacy would be hard to find!
Dr. Gell-Mann may well carry around his "share of metaphysical
baggage" without being aware of it, But there is no evidence
that any such metaphysical baggage interferes with his scientific
work in Grand Unified Theories (GUTS), nor that he explains away
counter-evidence with ad hoc assumptions as do so many
creation-scientists.
Common Design Hypothesis
But the sharpest difference between creation-scientists and
evolutionists turns on the explanation for resemblances of various
species, between classes and between orders. These resemblances
are known not only from comparative anatomy, embryology and paleontology,
but from serology and--most impressive of all--from protein similarities.
To explain such similarities by the "common design"
hypothesis simply won't work. This hypothesis usually is taken
to mean that God created any and all similarities between species,
etc., because such designs were seen by God, in His infinite wisdom,
to be the best for those creatures. But if this were the case,
then why are mammals found in the oceans, more like us than any
other creatures of the same environment? The common design hypothesis
suggests there should be only one common design for creatures
in a particular environment, yet we find mammals, reptiles, fish,
coelenterates, etc., all inhabiting the same oceanic environments.
How does common design explain such a great variety of differences?
Are warm-blooded creatures in an ocean a better design than cold-blooded
fish or reptiles? Are the scales of a fish any better a design
for the oceans than the thick skin of whales, dolphins and seals?
Those questions, and a thousand others, are unanswerable from
the common design hypothesis unless some new ad hoc assumption
is added to save a faltering hypothesis.
Evolutionary theory, on the other hand, suggests many different
ways in which creatures can adjust and adapt to the same environment,
depending upon which genetic pool they have to help them adapt.
If their genetic pool is not sufficient for rapid environmental
change, they become extinct a la dinosaurs, moas, mastodons
and thousands of other classes, species, etc. Did God in His infinite
wisdom goof in His design of these creatures but not of others?
To explain the demise of these creatures by a Noachian flood doesn't
explain the demise of creatures since the flood of Noah's time
(not to mention the scientific difficulties with the flood itself!)
Pseudogenes
But the coup de grace to the creationist common design
hypothesis comes from the data involving pseudogenes (see C/E
Newsletter, XIX, pps. 36-45). In short, a pseudogene is a
genetic error of no use whatever for the survival of a species
but persists in all species evolved from the species in which
the pseudogene originated (a rare occurrence). "...the existence
of two shared pseudogenes leads to the logical conclusion that
both the human and ape sequences were copied from ancestral pseudogenes
that must have arisen in a common ancestor of humans and apes."
This evidence is incontrovertible, i.e., that humans and apes
(in this case) shared a common ancestor, since there is no reason
why a Divine Being would create a pseudogene with no beneficial
results to that species. No doubt, though, some ingenious creationist
will invent some new ad hoc assumption to save the common
design hypothesis, or (s)he may try to discredit the scientific
work done on pseudogenes, as they tried to do for the transitional
fossil Archaeopteryx by claiming the latter was faked.
Space does not permit discussion of other differences between
evolutionist and creation-scientists alluded to by Chris Foreman.
However, he is quite right in objecting to the diatribes against
creationists often used by frustrated scientists who don't want
to get to the specifics of the data involved in their different
world views.
In conclusion, in view of my earlier discussion on censorship
it would be interesting to see whether this letter or some part
of it makes its way to the pages of Origins Research which
honors, admirably so, the principle of truth-seeking, as well
as those of being critical and open-minded.
Paul Ricci
Instructor,
Philosophy/Rel. Studies
Cypress College, CA
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Chris Foreman Responds...
Editor,
Certain issues raised by Paul Ricci in response to my letter
deserve further consideration. I will direct my own response into
five broad areas: censorship, a flat earth, metaphysical baggage,
ad hoc science, and Common Designer.
Censorship
The first objection raised by Ricci concerned censorship. He
began by replacing one definition of "censor" (mine)
with another definition of "censor" (his). I cannot
understand the reason for this switch nor for his insistence that
politics be the sole motivation of censorship. Does he imply that
religious, scientific, and literary censorship does not exist?
Next, he alludes to a straw-man definition of "censor"
(alleged to be mine) and proceeds to shred it to pieces. If he
believes that my definition of censorship--which he, himself,
quotes--allows for the exclusion of material on "spatial,
economic, and temporal grounds", then he is mistaken.
The essence of censorship lies in its motive. If it were truly
the case that special creation is being excluded from public schools
because of space and time constraints, then no censorship is taking
place. But this position is indefensible. Lack of public-school
resources is not the problem. Censorship is the problem. Moreover,
those who say that the creation position is being innocently omitted
rather than deliberately suppressed are compounding the problem.
Flat Earth
Ricci's repeated equating of creationists with flat-earthers
is offensive, but could prove instructive. Let us imagine that
a large portion of the U.S. population believes that the earth
is flat. Let us further imagine that a Gallup poll shows that
most parents support a balanced approach in public schools (i.e.
equal time for flat-earthers and round-earthers). If I were to
teach this kind of "balanced approach" in a public school,
I would be obliged to expose the flat-earth position as a fraud,
but I would do it with tact. When it came time to discuss the
shape of the earth, I would fearlessly provide the best available
evidence for a flat earth written by its best proponents. Then,
I would confidently provide the best evidence for the earth being
an oblate spheroid. No one could accuse me of bias. I have enough
faith in the shape of the earth and in the integrity of the mind
not to be intimidated by any flat-earth argument. The point of
this paragraph is this: Please give special creation a fair hearing
in public schools. If the whole notion is so patently ridiculous
(like a flat earth?), then what is there to fear? If special creation
is a Fundamentalist deception being foisted upon an unsuspecting
society, then why not demonstrate the deceit by contrasting evolution
to creation? Students are not fools. The best way to expose a
lie is to present its strongest case.
Metaphysical Baggage
Ricci does not seem to appreciate the vagaries of metaphysics
nor the influence of presuppositions. The word "metaphysics"
means "beyond science". Metaphysics is by nature conjecture
and speculation. It involves the structure of reality (ontology),
the underpinnings of the universe (cosmology), and the justification
of knowledge (epistemology). Some metaphysical systems may appear
more reasonable than others, but all are equally improvable and
all equally indifferent to evidence. In view of this, how can
Ricci term one metaphysical position "justifiable" and
another "irrelevant to science"? Or how can he suggest
that assumptions be shed while science is being practiced?
The events surrounding origins are historical and at best can
only be inferred indirectly. Physical objects cannot speak for
themselves. The naked face of reality must always be viewed through
a personalized set of colored glasses. Even famous scientists
are not exempt from this optometric imperative. Terms like "metaphysical
baggage", "presupposition" and "world-view"
describe the spectacles through which we must all view the world.
Ad Hoc Science
Ricci seems to imply that only creationists--and never evolutionists--make
ad hoc changes to their respective cosmogonies. This is
simply not true. The history of evolution since Darwin is a history
of one ad hoc change piled upon another. Examples abound
(Oort cloud, assumed intermediates, primitive atmosphere), but
space does not permit further elaboration.
Why is it that evolutionary scientists are entitled to overhaul
their theory with each hint of new evidence, but creation scientists
cannot fine tune their theory without being accused of ad hoc
science? Let's be reasonable. Modifications, redefinitions, and
refinements will occur in any scientific model, especially in
a model that purports to explain the origins of everything.
Common Designer
The final objection raised by Ricci deals with a Common Designer.
With all due respect, he appears to be confused about this issue.
Key to understanding the issue of homology is a clear differentiation
between "common designer" and "common ancestor".
On the one hand, a common designer is responsible for the resemblance
found among Haydn symphonies, Van Gogh paintings, Wright buildings,
and Hemingway novels. A Chevrolet resembles a Pontiac because
both cars are designed by General Motors. On the other hand, common
ancestry is responsible for the resemblance found between, say,
Donnie and Marie Osmond. Likewise, common ancestry explains the
resemblance found among horses, or among koala bears. The distinction
between common designer and common ancestry is apparent in these
cases.
The big question then becomes, "Why do human beings resemble
chimpanzees?" Is this resemblance due to a common designer
(like Chevrolet and Pontiac) or is it due to a common ancestor
(like Donnie and Marie)? Ricci would have us believe that this
question has been long settled--that, indeed, man and ape have
an unquestioned common ancestor. But his assertion reveals more
bias than science. The common ancestor remains as elusive as ever.
And why does he insist that a Creator/God form only a handful
of living types? Is it inconceivable that a creative God loves
variety, diversity, and individuality? Unlike Ricci, I am not
prepared to second-guess God and suggest that some other world
may have made more sense than the world we experience. Why does
it puzzle Ricci that God would create many flora and fauna with
common characteristics? Don't all inhabit a common earth? Don't
all partake of common air and water? Don't all share a common
food chain?
Many evolutionary pundits now concede that the entire cosmos
appears to be specially designed for human habitation. The argument
from design continues to appeal to the human mind because order
continues to recognize order.
Ricci's final comment on pseudogenes is a continuation of his
morphological argument, but on a molecular level. In fact, his
pseudogene finds a morphological analog in the vestigial organ.
Not surprisingly, the concept of "vestigial gene" suffers
the same shortcomings as does the concept of vestigial organ.
It may just be that the inability of science-in-its-present-state
to explain the function of a "pseudogene" does not reflect
imperfection in the gene. It may, just as well, reflect imperfection
in our present understanding of genetics. The "pseudo"
may more aptly describe the science than the gene. After all,
the number of vestigial organs has dwindled to the point where
the term "vestigial organ" has itself become vestigial.
The pseudogene may experience a similar fate.
Furthermore--evolutionary pronouncements to the contrary notwithstanding--common
ancestry is not the inescapable conclusion of a common gene. It
only becomes inescapable when God is presupposed out of the picture.
If God created both mankind and apekind with certain outward similarities,
could it not be expected that inward similarities (in blood, protein,
even pseudogenes) exist as well? Doesn't a similar structure suggest
a similar blueprint?
In conclusion, I must reiterate that evidence and evidence
alone arbitrate the truth about origins. In this connection, I
was disappointed that Ricci repeatedly appealed not to evidence,
but authority, in presenting his arguments. Like some medieval
scholastic appealing to Aristotle, he appeals to the authority
of evolutionary dogma. He pontificates that "the evidence
as understood by the majority of scholars is what is and ought
to be accepted." Please, present me with the evidence, but
let me understand for myself. Let me accept for myself.
Respectfully,
Chris A. Foreman
Tomah, WI
Copyright © 1997 Paul Ricci, Chris Foreman,
Access Research Network. All rights reserved. International copyright
secured.
File Date: 3.3.97
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